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Reaffirming Human Dignity in Disputes
Over Children Born From Assisted
Reproductive Technologies
by

Mr. Adam E. Frey

The lIwhor is lltr;s Ductor Cml(lidate. Art' Maria Sellool oj Ul\\'.

1. lnlroduction
In 1998. a California appeals COUl1 made an astonishing ru ling: the legal
parents of a chi ld e ngineered by the cOlltributions of li ve peopl e were a
couple with no genetic relati on to her. including a "father" who had no
des ire to rai se her. III re 811::'(111(,(/1 o ri ginated whe n Jo hn and Luanne
Buzzanca. an infertile coupl e. contracted with a sun'ogate. Pame la Snel l. to
carry and birth a child conceived fro m anonymous gamete donati ons .
lit igutio n began after the Buzzanca's marria£c broke down. with John
di vorci ng Luanne one month before the chi ld. Jaycee. was born. John
attempted to avoid child suppon . arg uing that Jnycee was not a child of the
marriage. The court ultimate ly m led that he was li able, because he and
Luanne were the "Iegal parents" of Jaycee, despite a lack of bi ologica l
relationship, The court reasoned that because the coupl e " intended" to
bring about Jaycee's ex istence, and because they were the "first movers" of
Jaycee's existence through the ir "procreati ve cond uct." they equated to
natural parents. Con troversia ll y, the court then ordered the Bu zzancas'
names e ntered o n Jaycee's birth certificate. deletin g Sne ll as the birth
mother.
Califo rnia 's ri sing "i nteru theory" of assisted reproduction literall y
means that couples usin g assisted reproductive technologies (A RT) always
have a superi or c laim of parentage over an egg do nor. spenn donor. o r
gestational surrogate, Conseq uentl y, intent theory in ART cases hus since
deve lo ped increasing popularity amo ng fam ily law scholars, Some argue
Ihal the theory a ll ows infertile women to com pletely bypass the adoption
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process and instead attain automaticall y the same status as a biological
parent." Likewise. a homosex ual couple arranging the creation of a child
can do the same thing. so that two persons of the same sex could become
the chi ld's "natural parents ... ·• Most disturbingly. the logical conclu sion of
intent theory guarantee!i that "i ntending parents" wi ll always wi n over
biological contributors in paternity disputes. In theory. an adopting couple
could sue for specifi c perfonmll1ce if. for exa mpl e. a surrogate mother
reneged on an ag ree m e nt.~
This jurisprudential speculati on may be premature and dangerous.
In the exc itement over the supposedl y positi ve applications o f imem
theory, scholars may have overlooked the negati ve ones . The term "imenC '
inevitably brin gs to mind contract and property law. ~ Enforcing the
promi ses of up to fi ve people might be licit but for the involvement of a
sixth person who has 110 say in the mailer: the chi ld. whose life has been
haggled over. bartered, and give n a j udi Cial stamp. Whil e there has yet to
be a five-way di spute ove r a child 's paternity. wi th the increas ing use of
ass isted reproduct ion. the questi on is now one of when. and how we ll
intent theory holds up whe n it is trul y tested.
Thi !> article proposes that the intent theory of ART parentage is
mi splaced and dangerous. In settling future di sputes over legal parentage,
court s and legislatures should first consistently remember the inherent
di gnity of the child at the heart of the di sput e. Thi s article then will
examine the flaws of intent theory in light of the meaning of human
di gnity, and conclude that court s shou ld seek an alternati ve means of
resolvin g these di sputes.
II. The Nature of Assisted Reproductive Technology

Ass isted reproducti ve technologies can take several different fonns ,
many of which require more than two people. For purposes of thi s
di scussion, they include "traditi onal" ' surrogacy arrangements.
"gestational" arrange ments. and sperm donation.
In a "traditional" surrogacy arrange ment. the mother bearing the
child is impregn ated with the sperm of the adopting father. meaning the
birth mother is also the child's genetic mother." In a "non -traditional"' or
"gestational" surrogacy. the mother is implanted with the fertilized egg of
another woman , and has no genetic relationship with the child. There. the
child 's genetic mate rial may be supplied by one or both of the indiv iduals
inte nding to rai se the child {although genetic material also can be from
anonymous donors).7 A "substitute fath er"' ca n also be used: a fert ile
woman may be artifi cially inseminated with the sperm of a man other than
her husband (called "heterologous" artificial inseminati on), also often
anonymou sly.8
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Coupl es are thus capab le
combining any o f these procedures 10
birth a child . such lhat it is now poss ibl e 10 haw up to fi ve "pare nts" of a
c hild : <J spe rm do nor. egg do no r. gestational surrogate. and two adoptive
parents. BII:::;allca is appare ntl y a rare ex amp le o f that combination ;
usuall y. a sing le person has several contributi ons. For example. in o ne
famoll s surrogacy case. the egg donor and gestator we re the sa me person.
as were the sperm donor and udopti ve falher.<J
Where the donors are known. the contracting parties o ft en agree Ihat
the donor will relinqu ish a ll parental claims to the child.
Such
arrangements are essenti all y the equi valent o f pri vate adoptions I() (Often,
the non-gene tic parent is requ ired 10 fo rmall y adopt the child ). For
example. a gestationa l surrogate would agree to carry the child to te rm and
the n sun'ender her at birth . S tatc ~ vary o n the enforceabili ty o f such
arrangeme nts: some reg ulate them by statute, others hold the m void as a
matte r of public policy. and a few still ho ld them illega l. 11

Ill. The [m'iolability of Child Dignity
The fi rst premi se of th is artic le is that. in resolving the issue o f the
c hild 's pare nt age, the inali e nable di g nity o f the chi ld in questi o n mu st be
respected and pro tected by the lega l system. The law cannot fo rget that the
life of ~I child. 110t a chatte l. i ~ at the heart o f these d isput es . While thi s
noti on sho uld be o ne o f commo n se nse . an eX<lminmi on o f inte nt theory
reveals that thi s basic respect for c hildren is now a secondary
consi deratio n. A brie f ex aminatio n o f the concept o f di gnity is therefore in
order.
A child 's dig nity is. of course . the same notio n o f di gnity that applies
to all human persons. That concept appears in the United States'
Declaratio n o f Inde pe ndenceY in the Preamble of the United Natio ns'
C harler. l.l and the United Natio ns' Uni versal Decl aration of Hu man
Ri ghts. H The Declaration o f Human Rig hts in parti cular ho lds lhat di gnity
vests at birth because c hildren arc considered "perso ns" from birth . and
because human d ignity ex te nds to a ll persons. it must fo llow that this
concept o f inal ie nabl e dig nity be lo ngs to children as wel l.
The conce pt o f human di gnity is unfo rtunatel y diffic ult to de fin e
prec i se l y.l ~ but is sti ll considered the source of all human ri ghts. II> Whil e
the modern connotati o n o f the word is apparentl y shifting from the
Chri stian noti o n o f "sacredness" to o ne centered on indi vidual autono my
in stead Y the basic te rm is sti ll syno nymo us with the ;'inlrinsic worth" o f
the indi vidual.'8 In havin g intrinsic wo rth. human beings are an end unto
themsel ves. It is therefo re always illi c it to use perso ns as a mea ns to an
e nd l') (such as through bo ndage). Di g nity also suggests that o ne person
cannot be more " va luable" than anothe r: instead . there is substantial
Nove mber. 2004
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equality hetwee n persons. o r si mply: "Ench person is as good as every
oth e r:' ~!1

Human di gn it y is <l Isa conside red "ina lie nable," meani ng that it
cannot be removed under any c irc um stances . no matter the method.l !
Govern me nts th us have the power to e liminate slavery a nd pro mote decent
human co n d i ti o n s.~~ Th is a lso means that while chi ld ren are not fully
capable of exerc ising thei r rig hts until adllltilood. and pare nts have the
power to exercise rights o n the ir be h a l f. ~3 parent s do not and cunno t 0 11"11
c h i l dre n . ~~ Rather. the law assumes that pare nts are stewards of their
children until (hey reach the ir majority. 25
I. Human Dignity According to the Catholic Church
The Catho lic C hurch o lf ers panic ul arly insightful no tio ns of human
d ig nity. e 5peciall y in the context of children and ART. In the eyes of the
Church. d ig ni ty is "rooted in [man 'sJ creat ion in the image and like ness of
God ," 2~ and there fore is invio lab le and unquesti onable Y In Celll e:jilllll.',·
AI/litts, Po pe John Pau l II warned that children sho uld not be considered
"as o ne. of the many ' things' which an individ ual can have or not have..
accordi ng to taste. and which compelc with other poss i b i1 iti es."~~ T he
statement stems di rectly frolll the notion of d ig nity: chi ld ren do not ex ist
for the sake of appeasing a p.lre nt's des ire to have chi ld ren. El sewhere. the
Church notes that:
A c hild is not ~o m e \ hing owed to one. bUl is a gift. The "su preme
gifl of marriage" is a human pe rson. A c hi ld may not be
considered a piece o r property, an idea to IYhkh an alleged "right to a
child'· would lead. In th is area. only the child possesses genuine
riglu s: the righl .'\0 be Ihe fruil of his parents:' and "the righl 10 be
rest)ccled as a person from the moment of his conception:·.")
Thtrefore. children have the right " to dc\·c1op in the mother's womb
from the moment of conception" ,md "the rig ht \0 li ve in a united
family and in a moral cnviron men! conducive \0 the growth of the
child's personality......'

These ideas arc deri ved from the not io n of human di gnity. Since children.
as hu man persons. have di gnity. they cannot be treated as a '·means to an
e nd: ' such as ex isti ng to appease the ir parents' desire to procreate. Rather.
in the pro per view of the fa mily, the pare nts' desire to proc reate coincides
with any c hil dre n born of the marriage. so that the chi ld is welcomed into
the ho me. rather than viewed .1S an ex pectation .
The moral wrong is partic ularly apparent fro l11 a rece nt story
involvin g ART in which a deaf lesbi an couple. Sharon Duchesneau and
Candace McCullough. ill/ell/ ioll all.'" genetically eng ineered two deaf
children us ing sperm fro m a dea f do no r.J ] The women c laimed that
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deafness is an identity, not a disabili ty. and wanted their children to share in
that identity. They reasoncd that "a hearing baby would be a bless ing: a
deaf baby would be a spcciu l blessing. '1 and frankly stated that the
arrangcme nt was their attcmpt \0 create a "prefect baby...·'3
The intemional disabling of a c hild and ca lling it a "blessing"
severe ly violates child dign ity to a new degrec: in the minds of the couple.
their children are something to be prepackaged and atTJnged to satisfy fheir
conception of a "perfect" baby who can share in the "blessin g" of deafness.
Apparently. they ignored whethe r the chi/dre" wou ld reciproc'ltc that
desire (and it will be interesti ng if these c hildren decide to sue their parents
in the futu re). In the parcnts' minds. the expectafioll of having a chi ld who
could share their handicap justified the children's intentional mutilation.
These ideas are criti cal in accounting fo r why the Church opposes
form s of ART that separate proc reation from the conjuga l act :u Because
ch ildren have the right to be conceived in their mothers' wombs, much of
the prob lem is that ART using genetic material not of the persons who will
rai se the child "infringes the child 's right to be born of:l fath er and mother
known to him and bound to each other by maniage:' 15 While ART
involvin g vllly a husband and wife are "less reprehe nsibl e" (such as a wife
<ll1ifi ciall y inseminated by her husband's semen), they still ure wrong
because, in addition to treating the child as something "owed", the act
"e ntrusts the life and iden tity of the e mbryo into the powe r of the doctors
and biologists and establishes the domination of technology over the origin
and destiny of the human person." }/>
The imporlJnce of conjugal procreati on, as opposed to artificial
means. has been stressed by John Paul II :
[n conj ugaltovc and in tran:-miHing life. the hurn.m c<.J nnot fo rgel his
or her dignity as a hum'lIl person: it raises the natural order to a
certain level. one which is no longer mere ly biological. Thai is why
the Church te:lches that responsibility for love i). in separable fmrn
responsibility from procreation. The biologica l phenomeno n of
human reproduction. wherei n the human person linds his or her
beginnings. also has as its enu the emerge nce of ,I new person. unique
and unrepealable. l1l<lde in the irn<lge and like ness o f God. The
dignity of the procreat ive act in which the interpersonal love o f the
spouses tinds in its c ulmination in the new person, in a son or
daughter. emerges (ro m thai fae!. Thai is why the C hurch It'';tches
that openness to life in conjuga l relations protects the very
authenticity of the love f(·l;uionship.17

Thi s stateme nt verifies why the conjugal act is a moral requirement of
procreation. In ART techniques wbich separate the two, the effort "forces"
the child into existence for the satisfaction of the parents' (admittedl y
November. 2004
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benevo lent) desires. However. in the Church's unde rstanding o f marriage,
the uni on of the coupl e in the conjugal act is meant to be "open" to the
transmi ssion of life ;'~ so that any resultin g chi ldre n arc welcomed rathe r
than ex peeted .Jq " No one may subject the comi ng of the child into the
world to conditi ons of tec hni cal e ffi ciency which arc to be evaluated
according to standards of control and dominion:·.J(j Whil e pare nts who
procreate through the conjugal acl. like A RT parents. ;llso mi ght desire
children fo r the sake o f sati sfying the procreati ve urge. the conjugal act
itse lf does not vio late the c hild 's d ignity. Conjugal procreati on al ways
o perates indepe nde ntl y o f the intenti on of the parents: couples can desire a
c hild and not become pregnant . whil e o thers can take steps to avoid
conception and still h;we pregnancy result. Ideally. the parents' intentio ns
sho uld coinc ide with the bi o logical reality o f the child 's concepti o n. So.
while pare nts' intentio ns mi ght offe nd the di gnity o f the child . the means of
conception sho uld not.
The Church con siders surrogacy arra ngeme nts part ic ul arly illi cit.
"Surrogate motherhood agree me nts. with o r witho ut the pay me nt o f
moncy. treat the ch ild as a non-person . as an item o f propen y to be
di sposed of at the will of others witho ut regard to hi s own interest... ~' TIli s
state ment works in <:onj ullction with the C hurch' s interpretat ion of the
seventh commandment. whi ch " prohibits actio ns or enterpri ses whi ch for
any reason- se lfi sh or ideo logical. comme rcia l or to talitari an-lead 10 the
e nslavement of human be ings. di sreg,lrd for their pe rsonal di gnity. buying
or selling or excha ng ing them li ke lllerchandi se:·J" A lt ho ugh surrogacy
arrange ments do no t conjure up be lligerent image s o f slavery. they
nonethe less fit the tec hnical definiti on because the sale of a child is the
result.
2. Posilive Law Bases of C hild Dignity
Modern Ameri can positi ve law generally refl ects the above concepts
of human and child dig niry. It is ax io matic that children are not prope rty.
bUl are persons who need protectio n fro m the parent. or failin g that. the
state. J·1 One autho r notes th at "Ia] 'child ' is a person. and not a subperson
over whom the parent has an absolute possesso ry inte rest: a child has
rig hts. too. some of w hic h are o f a constitutio nal magniludc:·.u Likewise .
the parent-child relationship is considered a status. ne ither a contract nor a
property ri ght. The re lati onship is strong enoug h that it can o nl y be altered
in nccord with due process.J·~ "rTlhe usual view is that the ri ght cannot be
dealt with as tho ug h it were a vested propen y ri ght. Rather, it is in the
nature of a trust imposed on the pare nt fo r the child's be nefit : !..lt>
II.
lVieg(lll d.J7 a c hild po rnography c ase. illustrates the imporwnce o f child
di g nity. Speaking fo r the Nimh C ircuit o n why child porno graph y was
illegal , Judge Noon an wro te :

u.s.
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The cri me is Ihe offen se against the c hild- the harm "to the
physiological. emotional. and men tal health" of lhe child.. the
" psychological
h:lrm" .. the
invasion
of
the
child's
··vu lnerabilit{· ... These h:lrntS co llectively arc the consequential
damages Ihat n ow from the trespass agains t the dign ity of \hl.' chi ld.
Any photograph makes its human subject an objet!. No offense \0
human dignity is do ne. The pornographic pholOgrapher subordinates

the humanity of his subject 10 the sexuality of the subject. The
humanity of the subject is not el imin:lIcd: how could il be ? Indeed
the interest of the pomogmph('1' is in the human person treated as a
sexual object. From a femi ni st perspective. th is reduction of
humanness has been seen as a male otTcnse ... Bul whether the person
is mllle or fellmlc. the essential opermio n is the same : lin assllu lt upon
the humanity of the perso n pictu red. making Ihat person a mere
means serving Ihe voyeuf·s purposes ... Human dignit y is offended
by the pornogrJpher. American 1:tW does not prolect :111 hum:m
dignity; legally, an adult ca nnot cOllsentlO its diminishment. When a
child is made the target of the pornographer-photognlphcr. the statute
will not suffer the insult to the human spiri t. that the ch ild shou ld be
treated as a Ihing .~"

At least onc court has also reflectcd the idea that a chi ld is not
··owed'· to an indi vidual. even in light of the constitutional righ t to
procreation. In the fam ous DC/by M case. part orlhe court· s justifi cation for
voiding the surrog:Ky contract was its view that
Itlhe right 10 procreate very simply is lhe right to have natural
chi ldren. whether Ihrough sexual intercourse or anificilll
inseminatio n.
It is no more than Ihal. The custody. care,
companionship. and nunuring that fo llow birth are not parts of the
right 10 procreation; they arc rights thaI may also be const itutionally
protected. but that involve considerations other than the right of
procreation .~*

While not passing judgme nt on ART per se. clearl y the court was opposed
to the notion that tile chi ld was a ··thing·' somehow owed to either of lhe
panics based on their right to procreate.
Ult imately. the issue of human and ch ild dignity by itself does not
answer the question of who the proper parents are in ART di spu tes. Rather,
dignity acts as a gu ide line on how the law shou ld 1101 act: that is, the law
must ensure that the child's dignity, already damaged as a product of Art, is
not violated any furth er. The chi ld shou ld never be objectified. but shoul d
be considered a rea l party in interest whose future and identity are at lhe
heart of the di spute. Whi le dignity impl ies [hat any determi nation of
November.2004
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parenthood mi ght be acceptable. it docs ex plicitl y mean thai a theory based
o n contract or pro perty is illicit.
IV. Critiquing Inte nt Theory in Lig ht of Human Di gnity
A. Origins of Intent Theory
I . Jol"'.w lt

I'.

Cutrert

Popul ar application of the intelll iheory of parentage has its origins in
l ohnSOIl \'. C (/ h'(!I"f.!O a 1993 Califo rn ia case. Mark and Crispin a Ca lvert
were unable to benr chi ldre n, and contracted with A nna John son to be
implanted with an e mbryo conceived fro m the Ca lverts' game tes. Shol11y
after implantat io n. the parti es' re latio nship deteriorated, and Johnson
threatened to keep the child unless full pay ment was made. The C llve rts.
in turn . sued fo r a declaration that they were the legal parents: Johnson
coumersued for a similar declaratio n.
The problem. according to (he cou rt . was that Califo rn ia a llowed
either blood o r birth as suffi cient proof of maternity. The relevant stat ute's
language was permi ssive. using terms such as " may" and '·or." which the
court viewed as creati ng equall y persuasive alternati ves between blood and
birth . Even the old adage. I/Ulla l'st qllom gestatio demollsfral (by
gestation the mothe r is demonstrated) suggested to the court that "while
gestation may demonstrate materna l slalUS. it is not the sill e q lla 11011 of
mo the rhood . Rather. it is poss ible that the cOlll mon law viewed gene tic
consanguinity as the basis fo r materna l rights."s,
The court resolved this appare nt con fli ct by relying all the parties'
intentions, holdi ng that "w hen the two means do not coincide in one
WOt11<lI1 . she who intended to create the child- this is. she who inte nded to
bri ng about the birth of the chi ld that she inte nded to raise as ber own- is
the natura l 1ll00 her under Califo rn ia l aw."~~ Its rat io na le was based
primarily o n the theories of Professors HitP J and Shultz.:\.! It fi rst appl ied
Hi ll's theory of " but-for causation": " tbe chil d would not have been born
but for the effort s of the intended parents ... The intended pare nts are the
fi rst cause. or the pri me movers. of the procreative re latio nship."5s It
simi larly re lied o n Professor Sh ultz's be lief that ·'the mental concept of the
child is the controll ing factor of its creatio n. and the originators of that
concept merit fu ll credit as conceivers."'16
The JoIIII,wJII maj ority also re lied 0 11 Professor Shultz's be lie f lhal
" Iw ]ithin the context of artilicia l reproduct ive tec hnolog ies ... inte ntio ns
that are voluntaril y chosen. delibe rate. express and bargained-for ought
presumptive ly to dete rmi ne lega l paremhood."57 Li tt le was said o n this
part icular point. alt hough Hi ll's article offe red simil ar comme nts that
furt her expla in tbe rationa le. Hi ll's thi nking is W0I1h repeati ng in full :
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ITlhe gestational host and genetic progeni tors sho uld be held 10
their origi nal promises not to seek any parental ri gills in the child . .
the deol1lological ."Irain hold ~ Ihat people generally should be held to
their promi ses simply bccauSl' promise keeping is good in itself. TIl(."
predicament or the intended pare nts is poignant precisely becau)'c the
surrogate's pmmise is the very basis for her involvement in the
procreative relationshi p in the ti rsl place. Absent a commitment o n
her pan. the intended parents could seek the assistance of another.
BUI where the gestational host. or the genetic progenitor. . . 11:15
gained access to the procreative relfltion ship initiated by another. ~ he
~ hould not be permitted the double inj ustice of reneging and. JllOTe
imponantly. retaining custody of the chi ld.
The consequcntiali st 5tr:Jin of this argument emphasizes the
reliance of the intended parents upon the promi se of other panics in
the procreative relationship. The intended parents rely. both
linancially and emotionally. to their detriment on the pro m i~e of the
biulog ical progeni tors and gestational hosl. They rel y finant" ially by
puTt' hasing lhl.' material essenli;lls of t"hild-rearing . including baby
fumiture . dOlhl.'s. toys. and other accessories. They may even move
or expand their home to accommodate the new arrival . If the promi se
of the other panil.'s were not enforl·eable. the intended parents could
not make these preparations without the po~s ibilit y of losing their
invesllnent .
More imponantly. the imendcd parents rely emotion.tlly on thc
promi ses of the others to refrain from claiming paremal rights in the
child. They rcly by preparing themselves psychologit"ally for
parenthood and all that it entai ls. They also rely emotionally to the
extent that they have interacted with the surrogate and anticipated the
binh of the ch i ld. s~

The two interrehlled concerns essentially revolve around contractual
reliance: that the intended parents' ex peClation s Illu st be mel. and that the
geneti c or gestational contributors must be prevented from renegi ng.
Another aut hor complai ns that the genetic basis does not "address the
seriolLs proble m of providing an adeq uate remedy for abuses in the
barga ining process betwee n pan ies involved in assisted reproductive
aml11 ge m e nt s: '~'1
Addi tionally. the CO Ull al so relied on Shu lt z'S notion that "the
in terests of children ... are unlikely to rlln contrary 10 those of adult s who
choose to bring the m into being."611 The in ference is that the contracting
parent s' desire to rai se a chi ld is indicati ve of their responsibility and
parenti ng ability.ltl Th is rule supposed ly would "promote certainty and
stabili l), for the child ...It~
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2. flaws in the )01111$011 Opi nion
Altho u2.h the resuh or Jolll1sOIl is in line with this no tc 's theories. the
reasoning is severely flawed. as ex pl<1ined by di sse nting Justice Kennard.o1
Ke nnard first observed that "but-for" causatio n is prope rl y applied in tort
law. but even the ll . California applied a "substantial factor" test in
causati o n. He conceded that the inte nd ing mother was. of course. a
"s ubstantial facto r" in the child's creati on. butlhe theory was "mi splaced"
because, in reality, "[bJoth the genetic and the gestational mothers are
indispensable to the binh of a ehild.().I illustrating that in the ART process.
all parties make apparently equal contributio ns, Thi s is specificall y
apparent where an intended parent screens the pote ntial candidate for
spec ific qualities (i.e .. the genes of a person with specific qualiti es. such as
In such cases . the geneti c parents'
appearance, tale nt. o r race) .
contributi on is heightencd becau se the contracting parcnt seeks a particu lar
type of person. maki ng the gamete donor's contributio n even mo re
··substantial."
Justice Kennard directl y di scusses the prim;iples of child di gnity in
hi s criti cism of the "origi nators of concept'" rati o nale of the majority. He
illustrates that the source of thi s reaso ning was from inte llectual property
law : the idea lhat "nn idea belo ngs to its creator because the idea is a
manifestat io n of the creator'S personality or self."6~ As Kennard correct ly
stated, the log ical end of this ratio nale is that the child mu st be conside red
the property of the intending pare nt. Thi s treatment of children as property
is antithetical to society'S understand ing uf childre n and famil y. There is a
manifest inappropriate ness in applying th is rati onale in order to reach
} ohnw}// 's result : it means lhat the child is a thing properl y owed to one
party o r another.
The same fa ult can be found with the " re liance" rati onale ad vocated
by Professors Shultz and Hill and the Jolmson majority. It is irrelevant that
the ART contract is vo luntary. express. de liberate. ;md bnrgained for. If the
contract were enforceabl e. the on ly real remedy is spec ific pe rformance.
the subject of which is the life of a child."" Aga in . this theory is hig hl y
inappropriateY as it treats the child as a means offulfillin g the ends sought
by the pare nts. Hill's above passage is revealing : the concern is primari ly
for the contracting parents' linancial and e motional investme nt. rather than
the child 's we ll being. It is a gross violatio n of di gnity to lreat the c hild as
a placebo to ease the contracti ng parents' loss. The child is not a party to
the contract. but instead the subject of it. Of course. the law rarely allows a
no n-signatory 10 be bound to a contract. and there is no reason to treat a
c hild born of A RT any d ifferently.
Wh ile people normall y should be held 10 the prom ises Ihey make .
thi s in no way means that contract law is always cOlltroll in g. 6k It is
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axiommic Ihm the law can declare certai n contracts vo id for
unconsc io nabi lity. If contract ultimate ly con trols ART dis putes. then wh.1I
is the lilllit to contract enfo rceme nt ? A purely contractual view of fa mi ly
law, regarding the fat e of persons. raises questi ons about where it stops. It
ri sks limiting the world to Justi ce Ho lmes' classic posi tivist noti o n o f
contract law tlm1 "all contracts are fOfmal. land] that the making of a
contract depends nO I on the agreement of two minds in o ne in tentio n. but
0 11 the agreement o f two sets of ex ternal signs: 'I>'J If the pre~bi rth sa le of a
child can be enforced. what prevents it after binh? What prevents suits for
specific pe rformance of abOil ion o r prostituti on '? In thi s regard. intent
theory canno t reconcile itself. If the contracting parents were proven the
natural parents. the n a kidnapping charge mi ght be far more effecti ve and
appro priate than a property theory.
What thi s c ri tici sm really calls for is a claim fo r re li ance damages. If
the iruending parents have honestly made large ex penditures in reli ance on
the delivery of a chi ld , the n re imbursement for thai qualllifiabl e reliance
mi g ht not be unju st. )(! The lim it is for the COLIrts to detem,ine, so long as it
fall s short o f spec ifi c performance in de li very of the chi ld . Professor
S hu ltz's advocacy fo r comract e nfo rceability and Professor Hill's "prime
mover" argu ment fai l to add ress chi ldren's rig hts and intere s t s . ~ 1 muc h less
their dignity.
The fin al argument. that the intent to parent is indi cative o f fitness.
also fail s for two reasons: it is bot h inflexibl e and speculative. Justice
Kennard agreed with the majority Ihat a rule seeking to protect the child's
interests should be paramount: hi s complaint. however. is that the rul e
makes an infl ex ible presumption for the contracting parentsY He fore saw
cuses of substance abuse, in stabili ty, econom ic ch'lIlge. and so on in the
homes of the contracti ng parents, wh ile the ho me of the parents deni ed
custody would be a rea li stically beller e nvironment.
Hi s ana lysis
illustrates another probl em of A RT agreemen ts: since {hey often amount to
the equi valent o f private adoptio ns. they occur o utside the watc hful eye of
state supervisio n. Thus. there may be no means of knowing whether the
indi vidual s to who m the chi ld is bei ng surrende red really are fit to parent.
In adoptio ns. the state should be present througholll the process " to protect
the integrity of the adoption process by which the child's ri ght to support.
management. and care may be re-estab li shed in rel ation to an adopti ve
parent .";·\ In ART arrangements. the slate has no presence unt il a problem
arises. So. whi le A RT allows parents to conveni ent ly override the red tape
of the adopt io n process. 14 those barriers do exi st in order to protect the
chi ld's safety.
The re lated problem is in declaring inte nt as indicative o f fitne ss;
while perhaps intuitive. it is ultimately specul ative. How do we know that
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tbe intended parents' intentions wi ll not run contrary to the child's best
interests? One author points out that
the intent to palent does nOl guarantee the ability In parent. A woman
is not miraculo usly invested with parenti ng skills j ust because she
wishes to parent. even when she has expended time and e ffon 10
accomplish Iwr desires.
Commissioning ~o upl e s in assisted
reproduction. and adoptive parents. who make extensive em.m to
hccome p'lrent s. are hardly more righteous than the rest o f the
popu l at i on. 7~

Add itionally, at least one case of an ART-conceived chi ld kill ed by his
adopt ive parents7b illu strales that '"intended" parent s are not
in sumtaneous ly fi t parents because of thcir intent .
Thc moral danger in ART cases show n by J OIIIISOIl is that parcnthood
is '"crea1.ed·' through contract. rather than as a social and legal relation. As
one aluhor notes. a status-based theory of parentage impl ies obligariolls on
a Illorall eve l, or. fa iling that. a legal requirement that those obligations be
fullill ed.n The source of obli gat ion s in a pu rely contractual view of
pare ntage is more ditTicult to pin point. As a result. inten t theorisls should
not be surpri sed lhat people like John Buzz an ca7~ or homosex ual partners
of genet ic parents of ART children 7'} wan t out of their parental obligations,
pointing to their lack of biologi cal connection as eliminating any
obligation to the child. While a paternity suit in such cases might be
cnforceable, the fa ct that these suits and their defenses mise should shock
no one in a worl d where the view of fam ily is shift ing from status to
contract.

3. It, re Buzzum·u
The fact s of Bllzwnca were di scusscd in Part I. above. As stated, the
Ca lifornia appeals court declared John and Luanne to be the lawfu l parents
of Jaycee, making John li able fo r child support. The result was reached by
a clever judiCial sleight-of-hand, relying on Jolll/.wI/'s determ ination that
Cal ifo rni a's patern ity law '"may" allow for paternity to be determined by
several means. Ilone of which expl ici tl y relied upon genetics. It also relied
upon statutes that allowed paternity to be established by seve ral nongenetic means. suc h as marrying the child 's mother before birth ,
consenting to being named as a fa thcr on a child 's birth ce rtili cate. or
consenting 10 the mt ificial insemination of one's wife. The court therefore
analogized the Buzzancas' situation to that contemplated by the artifi cia l
inse mination statute: " ... both contemplate the procreation of a child by the
consent to a medica l procedurc of someone who intends to raise the child
but who othenvi se does not have any biologicalti c.'·oo The cOLIn believed
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that the spirit of the Jaw warranted the ex tension of paterni ty 10 John
Buzzzanca as we ll: the fact dUll Luanne did nOl give b irth was irrelevant.

T he court observed that a simple estoppel theory wou ld have been
sufficien t to e nsure John 's paternity: however. it took the theory a step
furth er so it could al so declare Luanne to be the lawful mo the r. It likened
Luanne to "il hu sband in an artificial insemination case whose consent
triggers a medi cal proced ure whic h results in a pregnancy and eventua l
birth or a c h i l d ." ~ ' That is. just ;IS a husband could be declared a fat her by
consenting 10 insemi nation. so cou ld a mOlher because "there is .... no
reason 10 di stinguish between hu sbands and wives. B01h are equall y
sit uated from the point of view of consenting to an act whi ch brings a child
into be ing,"~~ That. combined with Luannc's inte nt to be Jaycee' s mother,
and the fac t that no other party attempted to cla im custody, made her the
" intended" mothcr under l olll/Mm, TIle court be li eved that public poli cy
encouraged thi s dec ision: the establi shment of patern ity wou ld prevent the
taxpayers from paying for the child 's care, Add itionally, Luanne 's
maternity necess itated thai John be ass igned paternit y: his " procreat ive
co nduc t:' albei t aJ1ifi cia i. made him just as liable as an unintended fath er
who e ng'lged in casual sex , Controversially, the court then declared that
the Bu zzancas' names should appear on Jayceee's birth cc]1ificale ,

4, Flaws in th e BlI u a"cll Opinion
A lthuugh thert: is ILO queslioll lhelt lhe OUI(;Ollle o f BII C .lIII(:lI was
correct. the caurfs method o f reaching it s conclusio n is even more
confusing than lolli/soli 's, While the dec isio n establi shed John and
Luanne as Jaycee's parents, it fa ils 10 spec ify exact ly what kind of parents
they are beyond a vague " lawfu)"' delemlinatio n, Are they " natural"'
parents? T he fact that the ir names were e ntered o n the birth certifi cate is
strong ev ide nce that the court intended thi s result , yet it re mai ns <l lega l
fi cti on that Luanne wi ll someday have to explain to her "daug hter: '
A like ly expl anatio n ro r the court 's ruling was thm the d ec ision was
outcome-determinative; aner all. the enti re nature or the dispute was
whether patemi ty o bl igati o ns were e nrorceable again st Jo hn, and Ihe
determini ng parentage was o nl y .. secondary issue, The court 's repealed
concem - that if Joh n we re correct. Jaycee would be an orphan and stale
ward- furth e r suggests Ihat the court 's goal was findin g any way to
enforce John 's obl igatio n,
A repeated concern raised by inte nt theori sts is Ihat, in favorin g
bio logy over inte nt. people like John Buzzanca wi ll have an escape to
avoid paternal responsibilityY T he result , as the BIlZZ{/I1 ClI court feared, is
that A RT-children would beco me state wards and taxpaye r burdens, The
hean or the matter is that a c hild has been brought into the world through
technology and then abandoned by an indi vidua l who unexpected ly
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wanted out of the contract. In ten n s of equlty. the decisio n makes sense:
Jaycee herse lf (and Lua nne o n her behalf) had a strong relia nce cla im
against John . That is, John's so-called " procreative conduct" creates
re liance o n Jaycee 's part that she wo uld have a fat her fi gure to prov ide her
with support. Thi s is illustrated by John's sig ning of tbe contract two
weeks aflcr implanl:.lti on: altho ugh Joh n actuall y sig ned the contract two
weeks a fter implantation. the coun correc tl y he ld the writte n instr ument
me re ly ratified an oral agreement.
A ll BU:":"lIllc a did was to advocate th e already-ex isti ng "equitable
parent" or "equitable adoption" doctrine , Because John assumed the soc ial
role of a parent vis-a-vis Jaycee, he co u ~ d have been estopped from
de nying lega l paternity.K4 Th is rule ex isted be fore intent theory. so
pragmat ically. " intent" covers anything new, In fa ct. view ing the decisio n
as o ne of equity exposes a major fl aw of intent theaI)'. As menti oned
above. some intent ad vocates believe that the ru le g uarantees stabi lity for
the child. since the intent of parents is unl ike ly to nm contrary to the chi ld 's
int e rests. 8~ Cases li ke B U1.:..(IIICli show otherwise. Real istica lly. a child 's
interests incl ude not just fina ncia l support fro m a pare nt. but also
emoti onal suppon and soc ial and mora l g uid;ance . Intent theory, despite its
cl aim. fa il s to prevent the proble m of deadbe,at parents. At best. thi s theory
only imposes a fi nancia l o bl igation to the c hi ld via the eq uitabl e parent.
Hence. John Buzzanca is nO! socially a father to Jaycee. but o nly a
ti nanc ial supplier. and bas swo rn never to be a fat her in a ny pract ica l
sense,86 While o ne author compla ins that these children "(Ire then le ft ill
limbo as to the ir parentage as well as the ir fi nancia l s u ppon ."~7 inte nt
theo ry e nsures only the latter. leaving the fo rmer sti ll in questio n.
So why d id the 8 11:..::,(lI/c (/ co urt go beyond a me re theory of eq uity?
Like ly, it d id so because it was the o nly way the coun could declare
Luanne's mate rnity. The courts had a lready du g a prove rbial ho le by
all owing the case to proceed fo r three years. d uring wh ic h Luanne and
Jaycee undoubted ly bonded as a famil y. ss It would be a strange dec ision if
i/lvo llll/lary paternity could be declared agai nst Jo hn , bu t 1101Il/l/(//,Y
pate rnity co uld not be granted to Luanne (S uch a result mi ght also Illcan
thai John , as a lawful pare nt. co ul d remo ve Jaycee from Luanne. the
unl awful parent. at his di scretion.). It is possib le that the circumstances
and elongated litigatio n left the coun no practical c ho ice by whic h to
guarantee Luanne's mutcrnity.
The problem is that the declaratio n was a complete legal fi ctio n.
How thi s theory will play o ut in future i:itigatio n (fo r example. if (I II
po tential do nors silll uitaneously sued for custody) mi ght revea l
problematic resul ts. In the short lenn . BU:":"(lJ/ca Illay have safeguarded the
soc ial fu nctio n of the family, as o ne author suggests.!!<J Bu t the co un 's
theory also undenn ines the traditional famil y in three respects. According
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to Professor Rad hika Rao. " the ideology of fami ly law is premised upo n
the e thos of ahrui sm:""qO that is. that the family is supposed to be. founded
o n love and affection. in polar opposit ion to market forces . whi ch are based
o n autonomy and arms- length transactions.91 Rao admits that thi s is a fal se
dichotomy: the family and market have always shared function s. and ART
ex poses thi s fac t :}~ Regardless of whet her the fam il y does have a
commercial basis. the perspective has frig htening implication s. By
view ing famil y as a contract, rather than a statu s. it again undermines the
sense of obliglltiull tied to famil y. She notes Ihal e liminating biol ogy
bri ngs the famil y closer 10 a world of pure private ordering y1 The potentia l
result is that famil ial commitments " become both contingen t and
revoc;'lble ... IPlaren thood by consent may encourage the att itude that
fami ly relati onships can be freely e ntered and exited. accepted or
rejec l ed:" }~ Third. Rao notes Ihat by making biology irre levant to ART
pare nts. il makes biology irrelevant to everyone: biology is no longer
suffi cien t o r necessary even for tradiliolla/ biolog ical parents." 5 Rao's
reasoni ng suggesls that parents of sex uall y co nce ived children now have
furthe r ince ntive to j ustify a lack of o bl igation to their childre n. If 11 011 genetic ART parents such as John Buzzanca can free ly abandon paternity
and be liable on ly for finance s, what stops traditiona l biologica l paren ts
from doing the same'?,'" A grow ing argument is thaI. under Roe 1'. mule, a
putati ve fathe r is all owed to escape responsibilities for a child j ust as a
mo ther can through abol1ion.'I7 The contractua l view of fam ily inevitab ly
creates such derivative result s.
If "intent" delellllines parentuge in ART cases. whal prevents intent
from being the paradigm of parenthood in every case? This view mi ghl
have little impact on most fam ilies. since most ""intended" parents are also
the biological parents of their chil dre n.
However. deJiIlCjuell1 or
i,uu/J'erlelll fathers theoretically could claim a lack of in tent. The theory
otherwi se creales an odd inconsistency: why impose liabi lity on a natural
fa ther who den ies responsib ility. yet deny paternity 10 an indi vidual who
seeks to e mbrace it? (Thi s could also impact a naluralmolher's abi lity to
revoke her consenl to her chi ld' s adoption: the law cou ld extend "intent""
even further to declare that a couple who intends to adopt a child shouldn't
be denied specitic performance.) BII:.zaIlC{/ likened itse lf to Slt'pliell K. 1'.
Roni L..'I!l in which a man who reli ed upon a fal se statement Ihal hi s sexual
partner was using bi rth control piU s could not bring a c lai m of fraud against
her after she became pregnant. It suggests thaI. in o rder to keep Bu::al/{.:a
consistent with SIf!plien K. type cases. application of intent theory should
be limited sole ly to ART di sputes. wh ic h is a mo re sensibl e result .
Theorists argui ng that inte nt is the paradigm of all parenwge have nol
explained bow a case like Stephen K. can be reconciled with the theory.
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B. Oth er Justifications (or I ntent Theory. and Responses
Another rationale for intent theory is that it creates certainty in the
detennin ation of a c hild' s parents. so her identity is not in "Iimbo" duri ng
litigation .'19 The rationale exists for two reasons: first. it discourages
biologi cal parents fro m suing: second. it supposedl y protects the ch ild 's
identity.II~) Th is concept, wh ile appealing. is still unpersuasive: legal
effic iency is no rea~o n to prevent a suit. particularly where one party might
justly be the proper parent. On the iiI'S! point, lawsuits may streamline the
legal process. but it fails to preve nt all lawsuit's. and ignores thm a beller
theory of biological parentage may yet exist. The argument agai n
presupposes that intent theory is the correct paradigm. and does not
address the theory 's merits. The argument also applies [Q allY model of
parentage: if the presumption favored biological parent s. the "bright-line"
certainty of a predictabl e result in liti gation wi ll rema in .
The second rationale-the protection of the child 's idemity- might
be more meritorious, since protecting the child 's sense of self is a poor
outcome . However. the "protection" wi ll probably o nl y amount to a
delaying tactic, since the child will inevitably di scover her ART origi ns and
still have her sense of self impacted. TIle "certainty" of paternity is also the
theory 's weakness-it speaks little of the chi ld's best interestsYIi It is
therefore hollow: intent only guarantees outcome. not well-being.
A confused and ultimate ly non-sequitur argument is that ART
arrangements must be enforced because to do otherwi se violates a
woman's fundam enta l ri ght to contract. According to one advocate.
"[pJrohibiting women from free ly en tering into contracts, or any type of
deal. demean s th em:'IU~ Obv io usly, women have thi s right, and no rat ional
jurist can question that. The rationale's flaw is its breadth: it assumes that
contract and free choice supercede any other consideration. The author
ignores that some contracts are unenforceable on publi c policy grounds.
such as illegality and unconscionabili ty. If women really have an unl imited
right to contract. does {hi s mean that a client for prosti tution can demand
specitic performance? Can an abonioni st do the same once a woman sign s
a consent form ? H a woman freely contracts to sell a limb. and then
reneges, shou ld the law e nforce it ?
This argument takes a question of conscience and answers with eq ual
protection , dodging tbe original issue. It unfairly delllalld.~ that women
stand by a potentiall y unconscio nable contract just to prove a point about
gender equality. Even if equal protection is a legitimate concern . !lana
Hurwitz's response is better. She notes that "[tJo exerc ise a change of he an
is both financially and emotionally costly for a surrogate ... [SJurrogates
who change their minds. despite the inordinate ri sks, demonstrate the
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autonomy and fonilud e of women, nOllhe ir supposed frailli cs ."Ii\.l
Thi s " ri ght to contrac t" also fail s to answer the moral question of
c hild sellin g or comracts invo lving c hildren. The argumem di ct:.lIes that
contract is always the morall y controll ing factor. 10-1 but a pure contract
theory ignores that the child 's future is being predete rmined by finan cial
exchan ge . So whil e intent theory mi ght stre ngthen wome n' s fundame nta l
rights, it severely impac ts those of lhe children involved.
A related argument is that indi vidual s e ntering ART contracts do so
with fu ll realization of the consequences. such as medical ri sks and
emotional costS. 105 Thi s theory points to the fact that many genetic
contributors already have child ren of their own . and are therefore prepared
for the ex perie nce of slme ndering a ch ild Ylb The fl aw he re is that while
iment is a basic requ ire ment of contract law. as the court complained in
Belisro I'. Clark, intent can be hard to prove . Hl7 FW1hermore, inte nt can
challge as the genetic contributor rea li zes the magnitude of the contract.
One au thor argues: "Inntenti ons concernin g: parenthood before a cbild
comes imo being are not required to be stable or fix ed ." I01! Thi s is apparent
from women who change their minds abollt g iving up a child for adoption
or having an aborti on. Ill'! The facl is that "'people's in te ntions are rarely unidimensional or everlasting, a nd it is rarely possible to ide ntify a person's
one, true inte nt ."llo Even a surrendering pare nt who has previollsly given
birth may not realize the consequences of giving away a child in contract.
"Given the c hanges in feeling that we know frequentl y occur. and that we
generall y wan t to occur, during pregnancy a nd at birth , the informed
voluntariness of the cboice to give up the chUd is at its peak when made
with fu ll awareness of the pain e ntailed- ·aFter the child comes into
being."111 Therefore. a lack of undue inO uence, duress, or coercion in ART
contracts is irrelevant , since some unconsc ionable contracts can be e ntered
wit bout those factors.
Furthe rmore. if the complaint is that some genetic contributors
already have children is taken to mean "so why do they need more?," the n
the state me nt is unfair. The logicul exte ns ion of the rational e is that
childre n arc Ulilitarian commoditi es. and that the bil1h of some children
decreases the need for more. The argument makes the gene tic pure nt
appear to have less necessity for that parti cul ar child. whil e the contracti ng
pare m has more necessit y for the c hild. Tbe intent argument c reates
roundabout sympalhy for the intended rec ipie nts. Regard less, sympathy
for the unfortunate infel1ilily of those persons does not entitle them to a
child as a social remedy. This argume nl recalls the importance of continual
re-e mphasis of the child 's ind ividual dignity. Even one intent theorist
admits that "'[e lmotions concerning parenthood are suffi cie ntly predi ctable
and of such a transfonning nature Ihal any a(le mpt to reduce them to the

November, 2004

297

four comers of a comract seriou sly undermines the profound experience of
creating life: ' I1~
The central basis for the contract model may be. as one author
claims. an underlying assumption that the human body is one's property
and therefore a fre ely transferabl e good. IU According 10 Kennit Roosevelt.
since many courts now recogni ze property ri ghts in ga metes. parental
rights should be delemlined by who has property right s in the reproducti ve
material when gestation begin s:14 in other words. parental ri ghts arc
derived from property ri ghI'S.
Roosevelt·s argument admittedl y has more merit. since he creatively
relocates where parental rights vest. Effectively. he concedes the power of
biology. but does so by stating thai gametes are as transferable as blood.
skin . and organs. If an egg is transferred from one woman 10 another. it
becomes the second woman' s egg. The problem is that Rooseve lt never
exactly states from where he makes the detennination that the body is
transferab le 10 begi n outside of a vague belief that ''["w ]ithollt any property
ri ghts in the body. we would have the odd result that others have as much
claim to our bodie3 as we do." II! He may have merely assumed the
assessment for the sake of hi s argument. But even assuming that the body
is property. Roosevelt ·s argument is Ihat palernir), is free ly transferable .
Things are certainly marketable. but neither a child nor a status can be
treated the same way. The President of the United States cannot sell hi s job
title. A parent cannot se ll the fact that he is genetically related to someone.
There is something disturbi ng about me body bei ng a property
interesL as Roosevelt himself admits. fIt• The language is inappropriate. as
it suggests that the human body is somehow separate from the human
person. The source of these propell y rights is not ex pl ai ned. unless it is
just some strange incidence of birth that one is bom with the body thm one
owns. The resulting question is whether one could theoreti cally sell his
entjre body. and if so. whether the law must enforce that contract.
Roosevelt notes thaI the 13t h Amendment's prohibition of slavery renders
one's rights in the body inalienable. 1I7 So even if property ownership
detennincs the relationshi p of the body to the person. our betler sense
suggests that there must be logical and moral limits to the ability ( 0 transfer
one's body. Hence. a contract fo r prostit uti on or aborti on must be
unconditi onally voidable by the person with the so-called property interest
in the body.
Thi s must also be true with ART. Since the transfer of both patemity
and a child is involved. this would also be a case where the conlract must
be voidable. Even Roosevelt admits that the transfer of patern ity and
children are illegal and void: hi s solution "cheats" the illegality by moving
the line of where pmem ity vests. Others frankly admit that the nolion of
" famil y" must be expanded in order to make the intent argument
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errective. !l~ Again. the problem is that lingui stic manipulation cannot
overcome t:l c tual and biological rea lity. Putting the Buzzancas' names on
Jaycee's birth certifi cate does not make them her natural parents. 1I9 The
effol1 is di sturbingly similar to the belief of Winston. the protagoni st of
Orwell's 1984. Ihat reality ex ists entirely within the mind. as determined
by the stute .I !O These theories do the same thing: they alter the reality of
paternity in order to escape the mo ral and legal prohibition of child sell ing
by mgu ing that no sale ever happened.
Even if iluenL theori sts be lieve that intent is a mere termi nology used
in parentage determinations. and no t a con tract. the problem is that contract
law must inevitably be applied in these disputes. That application. of
course. violates a chi ld's dignity by it s vCI)' nature. One author's criticism
is very revc;:tling:

In the end. the notion of intent cannot renect and preserve
autonomous individuality :tnd. at the same time. provide proof (as a
substitute for biological "facts" such as blood and genes) of the
enduri ng essence of fami1i;LI love and loya lty. Jud icial reliance on
iment in e;l:<;es such as Jvhnsoll will prove impractical or will be
expressly transformed inlo a more straightforward reliance on
ordinary t'ontract principles.' l'

FUl1her11l0re. as explained above. intent fail s to entertain seriollsly the
intere s t s.!~~ much less the dignity. of the child . Marsha Garri son very
succi nctl y describes the problem:
Given that our legal tradition precludes per se enforcement of :Ill
concerni ng children. a proposal 10 grant per se enforcement
to a single contract subset should be supponed by a detennination
that this group is sufficiently different from the remai nder to justify
incons istent treat men! . or in the event that the governing ad vocate is
will ing 10 ex tend per se enforcement to all cOlliracts governing
ch ildren's care and status.:I showing that thi s approach is preferrablc
\0 thc tradi tional one. ':)
contrac l ~

Until intent theori sts can make such a showing , inte nt theory will
ineviwbly collapse upon its own shaky fou ndat ion.

VI. Conclusion
Thi s article began by reaffirming that, when a c hild has bee n created
through ass isted reproductive tec hno logies. the primary and con tinual
considerati on o f the law shou ld be maintaining the chi ld's inalie mtble
d igni ty. While the very use of ART consti tutes a signifi cant violation of the
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chi ld's d ignit y, the violati on need nOI continue. The law cannot undo what
has happened. but can ensure that the child 's future is restored to its proper
path.
Thi s article hm; also illustnlled why " intent thcory:' the increasing ly
popular paradigm of parent'lge . is incorrect. Inten t theory ultimately acts
as a contractual model of parenthood thai half,heartedly attempts to protect
traditional no tions of children. parents. and the family. The theory treats
chi ld ren as fun gible property and the fa mil y as a contractual re lationship
that can be freely ex ited . In Ihe lo ng term. thi s theory wi ll do more ham1
than good to the social fun ct io n o f the fa mil y. It impro pc rl y c hunges the
family from a status to a contract. thereby eliminating much of the moral
va lue of the relationship. Thi s article has de monstrated that even the most
meritorious rationales for intcnt theory ultimately fail to create a proper
model of the famil y or to protect human dignity. While another theory
favoring " intended" parems mig ht be more acceptable. inten t theory in its
current form is unable to do so.
Lawyers, couns, leg is lato rs. and most importantly, pare nts, should
be wary of these considerations in the future . As Buw lllca indicated.
" ftlhese cases w ill not go away." The law must prepare to reaffil1l1 that
which made the family slic h a lasting insti tution.

The aliI hoI' wishes 10 Ihal/k hi.\· parellts. classmates. with particular thal1ks
to Jolm Mallos. Jasol/ Negri. Josh llo Skilll/t'I; Robert Klllcik. MOll ica L.
Secord. and Aile Maria Profe~':'iOn; Richard M.vers alld Jane Ado/pile.
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